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UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 13 FALL 1990 NUMBER 1
APPROPRIATIONS OF POWER*
Gerhard Casper**
The Virginia Constitution of 1776 expressed its commitment to
the separation of powers in the following words: "The legislative, exec-
utive, and judiciary department shall be separate and distinct, so that
neither exercises the powers properly belonging to the other: nor shall
any person exercise the powers of more than one of them, at the same
time . . ."I This commitment to the separation of powers doctrine
was shared by most of the original states. It is implicit in the structure
of the federal Constitution.
Historical discussions of the separation of powers doctrine gener-
ally focus on broad and tall questions about what the doctrine entailed
and how it resolved - or did not resolve - specific conflicts between
the branches of government.2 Under the federal Constitution, one of
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the most famous early examples in the latter category of questions is
provided by the debate over the President's power to remove cabinet
officers in the summer of 1789. Another example would be the contro-
versy, in the spring of 1793, over President Washington's neutrality
proclamation in the war between England and France. These are what
one might refer to as the heroic dimensions of separation of powers. In
this article I should like to turn from the heroic to the mundane, that
is: the worldliest of subjects - money. I hope, though, that by the
time I shall have finished you will be able to discern the heroic in the
mundane.
Much of what I will place before you has, at least in the past, not
stirred up much interest as a matter of separation of powers notions or
constitutional law. At present, perhaps because of the Iran-Contra Af-
fair, this benign neglect seems to be decreasing some.3 However, you
should not misunderstand my modest effort as a contribution, in histor-
ical disguise, to a contemporary controversy. I have, for quite a while,
worked on separation of powers theory and practice in the last quarter
of the 18th century. My primary concern is to understand better the
reactions and thoughts of those individuals who reflected about separa-
tion of powers as they implemented the new Constitution. As courts
were largely irrelevant to this enterprise, I hope I can demonstrate to
you the importance of nonjudicial materials for a more complete under-
standing of separation of powers. I hope I can also show you how sepa-
ration of powers notions find expression in legislative drafting
techniques.
The appropriations clause of article I, section 7 ("No money shall
be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made
by law .... ") is neither self-defining nor self-executing." Nevertheless,
few doubt the function of the clause as a prophylactic provision that
reinforces the Constitution's version of separation of powers by thwart-
ing potential claims of inherent power: the fact that there is a surplus
in the treasury and a good reason, even a reason authorized by law, to
spend the money does not empower the executive branch to "draw from
3. See, e.g., Stith, Congresses' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988); Stith, Re-
writing the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593
(1988) (hereinafter Stith, Gramm-Rudman); For a criticism of Stith, see Sidak, The President's
Power of The Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162. See also Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw
The Purse Strings, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 758 (1989).
4. Stith, Gramm-Rudman, supra note 3, at 600.
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the Treasury."5 Legislative control of money is well nigh absolute. If it
goes uncontrolled then only because the legislature itself is out of
control.
It took the English Constitution many centuries of advances and
retreats to get to this point of legislative supremacy. As Maitland puts
it: "We have to remember that throughout the Middle Ages the king's
revenue had been in a very true sense the king's revenue, and parlia-
ment had but seldom attempted to give him orders as to what he
should do with it."' As late as 1765 Blackstone still distinguished be-
tween the king's "ordinary" and the king's "extraordinary" revenue.
The former was "the proper patrimony of the crown," while the latter
was the supplies granted "by the commons of Great Britain, in parlia-
ment assembled." By the time of Blackstone the "extraordinary"
grants had, however, become the ordinary source of revenue for the
royal household and the operations of the government. Blackstone
viewed this development as fortunate "for the liberty of the subject."'
Extraordinary needs of the crown in times of war led to the refine-
ment of appropriations law. Two statutes from the reign of Charles II
enacted within a short period of one another illustrate the development
in capsule form. At the beginning of the second of the Dutch Wars,
Parliament granted a "royal aid" in the amount of nearly two and a
half million pounds: the amount to be "raised, leavyed and paid unto
your Majestie" within a period of three years. The preamble of the
"Act for granting a Royall Ayd" conceptualized the grant as a reim-
bursement for "vast expenses" incurred by Charles II in preparation
for war. The Crown had done what was necessary and the grateful
Commons did what was fair.'
When the war continued (Louis XIV joined the Dutch side in Jan-
uary 1666), considerably more money was needed. Parliament levied a
new tax but this time provided for the segregation of these funds as
they came into and as they went out of the Exchequer. The "Act for
raising Moneys by a Toll and otherwise toward the Maintenance of the
present Warr" prohibited the spending of these revenues other than by
warrant mentioning that "the Moneyes payable . . . are for the service
5. The proposition is disputed by Sidak in his attack on Stith. Most of Sidak's historical
arguments rest on exceedingly slender reeds. For a recent affirmation of the proposition by the
Supreme Court see Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 10 S. Ct. 2465 (1990).
6. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 309 (1926).
7. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 296-97 (1765-1769 & photo reprint 1979).
8. An Act for Granting Royall Ayd, 1664 & 1665, 16 & 17 Car. 2, ch. I.
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of Your Majestie in the said Warr respectively." 9 Parliament did what
was necessary and made sure that the Crown would do what was fair.
According to Maitland this precedent was not followed by the Par-
liament of James II, but it generated the rule after the Glorious
Revolution. As John Brewer summarizes, "the reign of James II had
demonstrated that disastrous and divisive policies could easily be pur-
sued by a monarch unconstrained by the need to consult 'the represent-
atives of the people.' " A member of Parliament from the period for-
mulated the crucial insight "'tis money that makes a Parliament
considerable & nothing else."'"
While not too much should be made of it, I note that the new rigor
in appropriations was displayed even before enactment of the English
Bill of Rights in 1689 - symbolically suggesting Blackstone's point
that there was a relation to the "liberty of the subject." An elaborate
act that was passed at the very beginning of the reign of William and
Mary levied a tax and appropriated the first 400,000 pounds to be col-
lected for the service of the navy. This amount was broken down fur-
ther into expenditure categories of one hundred thousand pounds each.
The statute said expressly that the sum appropriated to these uses
"may not be diverted or applyed to any other Purpose," required a sep-
arate account, specific warrants, and forfeiture of the like amount on
the part of those who might divert any of these funds." After 1691 the
1688 statute was supplemented by so-called Commissions of Public Ac-
counts for the purpose of scrutinizing government revenue and
expenditure. 2
The Glorious Revolution confirmed the principle that Parliament
controlled not only the raising of revenues by means of taxation but
also the expenditure of these moneys. As one turns to ask what the
implications of this approach might have been for the governance of
the North American colonies, one must first of all keep in mind that
9. An Act for Raising Moneys, 1666, 18 & 19 Car. 2, ch. 1, § 33.
10. J. BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER 143 (1989).
11. An Act for a Grant, 1688, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 1, § 45 ff.
12. J. BREWER, supra note 10, at 151. In assessing these developments it is important to
keep in mind that, while Parliament constantly thwarted fiscal policy under William, parliamen-
tary opposition rarely succeeded after 1702. Id. at 149. The point is made polemically by Albert
Gallatin in a speech to the House of Representatives in March 1798: "It is during that period
[i.e., after the Revolution of 1688] that a progressive patronage, and a systematic, corrupting -
influence have sunk Parliament to a nominal representation, a mere machine, the convenience
used by Government for the purpose of raising up supplies; the medium through which the Execu-
tive reaches with ease the purse of the people." 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 1133 (1798).
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what - after 1787 - we have come to call "dual sovereignty," de
facto prevailed even before the Revolution. The American colonists ac-
tually lived under two governments: the government in London and
that of their colony which, while not in possession of complete author-
ity, managed "internal police" and levied taxes for local purposes."3
Purposes for which taxes were levied were fairly limited. As Edwin
Perkins has stressed, in normal years, salaries for the appointed gover-
nor, for a few judges, and in some provinces for the recognized clergy,
plus compensation for their own legislative expenses, were typically ma-
jor items in the annual budget.1 ' One of the means employed to keep a
firm grasp over government officials was to limit appropriations for
these purposes to one year's duration and to distinguish between autho-
rizations to spend money and actual spending bills. In addition colonial
legislatures developed ways to control disbursements and audit ac-
counts. Indeed some elected their own treasurers to reduce executive
influence. 5
There were, of course, expenditures for purposes other than what
in England had become identified as the "civil list." Military cam-
paigns against the French, the Spanish, and the Indians were often fi-
nanced by postponing taxes through the creation of paper currency
(under legislative control). In part this debt was undertaken in the hope
that Parliament would eventually reimburse the colonists for a substan-
tial share of these expenses. 6 When towards the end of the colonial
period the king's ministers adopted new policies designed to shift more
of the tax burden for defending North America and the Atlantic ship-
ping lanes to the colonies themselves and to restrict, and perhaps even
outlaw, the use of paper money, 7 the War of Independence resulted.
As the newly independent states began the enterprise of constitu-
tion-making, there could be little doubt that the new constitutions
would be based on the separation of powers doctrine (though opinions
on what it entailed differed widely). There could also be little doubt
that the new constitutions would continue and further strengthen the
basic features of the fiscal constitution' 8 that had emerged in England
13. See A. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (1936).
14. E. PERKINS, THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA 190 (2d ed. 1988).
15. D. DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 17-18 (1924).
16. E. PERKINS, supra note 14, at 161-62.
17. Id. at 162.




and in the colonies. The unquestioned rule was that of legislative
supremacy.
The rule was unquestioned, though in the postrevolutionary Amer-
ican context, not necessarily obvious. Remember that the rule had de-
veloped under the conditions of mixed government where king, aristoc-
racy, and commons were differently based powers with different
interests, including different economic interests. After the Declaration
of Independence the issue was no longer the separation and balancing
of differently based powers, but the separation of power (in the singu-
lar) flowing from one source - the people. Yet in the eyes of many the
fact that legislature and executive derived their legitimacy from the
same source did not dispose of the ever present danger of waste and
corruption. As Herbert Storing has said: "Through limited grants of
power, tight responsibility, and internal checks, the few may be pre-
vented from doing much harm. . . -"I Put differently, even after the
Revolution, appropriations were seen as appropriations of power.
The fiscal provisions of the new state constitutions adopted be-
tween 1776 and 1787 differed, of course, from state to state, and in
most instances, were surprisingly rudimentary. We may attribute this
mostly to the fact that essential elements, as mentioned, had been
worked out during the colonial period and were not questioned as to
their basic soundness. Many of the first state constitutions contained
more or less elaborate provisions about taxation that I shall ignore
here. The most intriguing of these was section 41 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 which prohibited taxation except if it led to a bet-
ter deployment of resources - almost a public goods approach to taxa-
tion: "[T]he purpose for which any tax is to be raised ought to appear
clearly to the legislature to be of more service to the community than
the money would be, if not collected; which being well observed, taxes
can never be burthens."' 0
As to the mechanisms for controlling expenditures, many of the
constitutions contained an origination clause of the kind we also find,
for revenue measures, in article I section 7 of the United States Consti-
tution and that in English constitutional history dates back as far as
the beginning of the 15th century.21 "Money bills" were to originate in
the more popular of the legislative chambers. This approach which was
19. 1 H. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 53 (1981).
20. 5 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 3090-91.
21. F. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 182, 247.
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meant to assure that the frugality and economic interests of the com-
mon people were given their proper weight, can be found in most of the
new constitutions, though only New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vir-
ginia continued the roughly one hundred years old English rule
2  of
prohibiting upper house amendments to such bills.
Second, the treasurer, or treasurers, were usually "appointed" by
the legislature. In Maryland this power was reserved to the lower
house. 3 It is worth recalling that the various drafts of the United
States Constitution provided for appointment of the Treasurer by joint
ballot of both houses as late as September 14, 1787, when, in the inter-
est of conformity, this appointment was subjected to the general ap-
proach of presidential nomination and Senate advice and consent .2
Third, as to the matter of appropriations more specifically, only
the constitutions of Maryland and Pennsylvania used the very word.
Section 20 of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution gave the Supreme
Executive Council the power to "draw upon the treasury for such sums
as shall be appropriated by the house."2 Article 16 of the South Caro-
lina Constitution employed negative phrasing to the same effect, as did
the federal Constitution a decade later. South Carolina ordained that
"no money shall be drawn out of the public treasury but by the legisla-
tive authority of the State. 2 6 Other constitutions subjected gubernato-
rial spending to a warrant requirement. Still others were silent on the
matter.
Fourth, the Maryland Constitution of 1776 went beyond all sister
states by imposing procedural rules to limit trade offs between fiscal
and other policies. Article 11 of the Maryland Constitution contained
an admissibility rule of the kind that interests modern public choice
theorists:
[T]he House of Delegates shall not, on any occasion, or under
any pretence, annex to, or blend with a money bill, any matter,
clause, or thing, not immediately relating to, and necessary for the
imposing, assessing, levying, or applying the taxes or supplies, to be
raised for the support of the government, or the current expenses of
the State: . . .every bill, assessing, levying, or applying taxes or sup-
plies, for the support of government, or the current expenses of the
22. See id. at 310.
23. 3 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 1692.
24. See Casper, supra note 2, at 223.
25. 5 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 3088.
26. 6 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 3252.
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State, or appropriating money in the treasury, shall be deemed a
money bill. 7
This "germaneness" requirement displays a high degree of sophis-
tication concerning opportunities for manipulation of the legislative
process. I remind you that among the original states only Massachu-
setts and New York recognized an overrideable veto.
On the whole, the fiscal provisions of the state constitutions con-
firm our understanding that during the founding period money matters
were primarily thought of as a legislative prerogative. The reason for
this was not simply the insight that appropriations were appropriations
of power. It was also the - for us perhaps counterintuitive - hope
that assuring legislative supremacy in fiscal matters would bring about
the moderation, temperance, and frugality without which free govern-
ment would be endangered. 8 The New Hampshire Bill of Rights of
1784, in a limitation on the appropriations power, referred to "econ-
omy" as "a most essential virtue in all states." '29 James McHenry, a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention from Maryland and in the
last years of the 18th century Washington's and Adams's Secretary of
War, neatly summarized these considerations. McHenry explained the
appropriations clause of the federal Constitution to the Maryland
House of Delegates in November of 1787:
When the Public Money is lodged in its Treasury there can be no
regulation more consistant with the Spirit of Economy and free Gov-
ernment that it shall only be drawn forth under appropriation by law
and this part of the proposed Constitution could meet with no opposi-
tion as the People who give their Money ought to know in what man-
ner it is expended.3"
Organization and control of "the public's treasury" had been
among the most contested issues in the congress of state delegates that
served as the central law-making and governing institution of the Con-
federation. 1 In Philadelphia these matters remained essentially un-
resolved. It was left to the first Congress to determine the exact struc-
ture of the treasury. As I have recently emphasized in a different
27. 3 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 1692-93.
28. See VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 15, reprinted in 7 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 3814.
29. 4 F. THORPE, supra note 1, at 2457 (1784 N.H. CONST. art. XXXVI).
30. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 149-50 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
31. See J. SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789 50-74, 126-152 (1935).
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context, the legislation establishing the Department of the Treasury
placed the department in a class by itself. As distinguished from the
acts concerning the departments of State and War, it did not refer to
the Treasury as an "executive" department even though the Secretary
was removable by the President. An elaborate set of officers was spelled
out in detail. The officers included an assistant secretary, a comptroller,
an auditor, a treasurer, and a register, who were subject to a detailed
system of controls. For instance, disbursements could be made only by
the Treasurer, upon warrants signed by the Secretary, countersigned by
the Comptroller, and recorded by the Register."2 In contrast to the
other two statutes, the treasury legislation was silent as to a presiden-
tial power of directing the Secretary. Section 2 of the legislation listed,
among the duties of the Secretary, the duties "to prepare and report
estimates of public revenue, and the public expenditures" and "to grant
under the limitations herein established, or to be hereafter provided, all
warrants for monies to be issued from the Treasury, in pursuance of
appropriations by law."33
The Congress saw the Secretary of the Treasury as an indispensa-
ble, direct arm of the House in regard to its responsibilities for reve-
nues and appropriations. This reflected the incapacity of the House in
the spring and summer of 1789 to come to grips with the questions of
what expenditures (especially as to the war debt) would be necessary
and what revenues might be available. The House had appointed a
committee to look into these matters as early as April of that year. 4
When its report raised more questions than it answered, a committee
referred to as a "Committee of Ways and Means" took its place "to
consider the report of a committee appointed to prepare an estimate of
supplies requisite for the services of the United States for the current
year, and to report thereon." 35 This second committee was discharged
and its business referred to the Secretary of the Treasury as soon as the
latter had been appointed.36 The House ordered that "the Secretary of
the Treasury do report to this House an estimate of the sums requisite
to be appropriated during the present session of Congress, towards de-
fraying the expenses of the Civil List, and of the Department of War,
32. See Casper, supra note 2, at 240.
33. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, I Stat. 65 (1789).
34. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 231-32 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
35. Id. at 670-71.
36. The House did not establish a standing Committee on Ways and Means until 1795.
1990]
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to the end of the present year .... "'
Alexander Hamilton was more than ready. Within days of his ap-
pointment, the Secretary reported a detailed estimate accompanied by
four schedules covering everything, including the prorated salaries of
various doorkeepers. 38 The appropriations act that followed on Septem-
ber 29 essentially adopted Hamilton's estimates and aggregated ex-
penditures into the four categories Hamilton had employed. The first
act "making Appropriations for the Service of the present year" con-
sisted of one single section and read as follows:
That there be appropriated for the service of the present year, to
be paid out of the monies which arise, either from the requisitions
heretofore made upon the several states, or from the duties on impost
and tonnage, the following sums, viz. A sum not exceeding two hun-
dred and sixteen thousand dollars for defraying the expenses of the
civil list, under the late and present government; a sum not exceeding
one hundred and thirty-seven thousand dollars for defraying the ex-
penses of the department of war; a sum not exceeding one hundred
and ninety thousand dollars for discharging warrants issued by the
late board of treasury, and remaining unsatisfied; and a sum not ex-
ceeding ninety-six thousand dollars for paying the pensions to
invalids. 9
In separation of powers terms, these developments during the first
session of the first Congress are of considerable moment. First of all,
for purposes of developing estimates for appropriations, the House
views the Treasury Secretary as its own agent. Second, while the
supremacy of Congress is not in question, de facto only the executive
branch develops and indeed has the capacity to digest and prepare the
necessary information. As early as 1789 the basic pattern of interaction
gets established with the Secretary responsible for "estimates" of how
much needs to be appropriated. Third, the first appropriations act con-
tinues to employ the concept of a "civil list" and distinguishes from
that civil list the expenditures necessary for the War Department - a
matter of considerable consequence later on. Fourth, the act, by aggre-
gating expenditures into lump sums raises the important separation of
powers question of what legal significance the underlying detail has.
37. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 34, at 894-95.
38. 5 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 381-92 (H. Syrett ed. 1962).
39. 1 Stat. 95 (1789). In this article I am focusing exclusively on the annual appropriations.
In addition to appropriations for the ongoing operations of government, there were special appro-
priations, supplemental appropriations, and legislation dealing with government debt.
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Finally, it brings to the fore the equally noteworthy question as to the
significance for the operations of the government of the formula "a sum
not exceeding."
40
In January 1790, as part of his larger Report relative to a Provi-
sion for the Support of Public Credit, Hamilton gave his estimates for
the year 1790.41 He submitted a supplementary report in early
March.42 The "Act making appropriations for the support of govern-
ment for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety," dated
March 26, once again distinguished between civil list, war department
and invalid pensioners, and employed aggregate figures. This time,
however, the legislation specifically incorporated the estimates. For in-
stance, as to the civil list the act appropriated a sum not exceeding
$141,492.73 "for defraying the expenses of the civil list, as estimated
by the Secretary of the Treasury." Where estimates were beside the
point, as in an appropriation of $10,000 for "contingencies of the gov-
ernment," the President was asked to account for expenditures by the
end of the year.
The legislation also made clear that Congress ordinarily distin-
guished between authorizing legislation and appropriations by a sepa-
rate provision authorizing the payment of various specified debts to in-
dividuals "not heretofore provided for by law, and estimated in the...
report of the Secretary."'4 This distinction had previously figured in the
House debates when an attempt was made from the floor to reimburse
lighthouse expenses for Charleston, South Carolina - the attempt was
rebuffed as this was "a bill of appropriations, and not of grants."
Porkbarrel had raised its ugly head: "Should this be granted, every
member in this House will come foreward with proposals for clearing
rivers, and opening canals to the source of rivers. '
The acerbic Senator William Maclay from Pennsylvania com-
plained bitterly about the manner in which the 1790 appropriations act
had been pushed through the Senate without his even being able to get
a copy of the bill. Failing to appreciate that, from his vantage point,
the bill actually represented a technical advance, he thought that the
lump sum appropriations gave the Secretary the money "for him to
40. The classic treatment of these matters in the literature is found in L. WILMERDING, JR.,
THE SPENDING POWER (1943). 1 refer especially to Wilmerding's chapter II.
41. 6 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 129-36.
42. Id. at 280.
43. 1 Stat. 104-05 (1790).
44. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1450 (1790) (statement of Rep. Bland).
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account for as he pleases."' 5 In reality no such power had been appro-
priated. As Lucius Wilmerding points out,"' Hamilton, at the begin-
ning of the month, had asked the House to provide rewards for the
apprehension of counterfeiters: "The Secretary further begs leave to
observe, that occasions occur from time to time, which fall under no
stated head of expenditure, for which provision in some mode or other
is necessary. ' '41 This is hardly the language of an executive branch con-
sidering itself free of constraints.
The 1791 appropriations act took essentially the same approach as
that of the prior year.48 By the end of 1791, however, attitudes began
to change as the partisan tensions that had been generated by the con-
troversy over the Bank of the United States lingered on and the Repub-
licans began to emerge as a more or less organized faction led by Jef-
ferson and Madison.4" Hamilton had conveyed his estimates for 1792 in
November 1791. The total of a little more than $1 million included
about $50,000 "to make good deficiencies" in prior estimates - an
indication that the government had exceeded its authority. 50 When one
examines the list of deficiencies in detail, one finds that most items
pertain to expenditures authorized by law in the course of 1791 but
lacking appropriations. Deficiency appropriations in practice covered
advances made in anticipation of appropriations.51 Anticipation of ap-
propriations more generally was due to the fact that annual appropria-
tions were frequently delayed until well after the new year. Indeed, as
Hamilton pointed out after leaving office, advances had been made to
members of Congress "in anticipation of their respective
compensations."52
The House debate on a committee bill for the 1792 appropriations
led to a fair amount of acrimony over whether the committee should
first have inquired into the expenditures under previous appropriations.
James Madison:
45. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 226 (K. Bowling & H.
Veit ed. 1988).
46. L. WILMERDING, JR., supra note 40, at 22.
47. 6 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 282.
48. 1 Stat. 190 (1791).
49. For an account from a Hamiltonian perspective see F. MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON: A BIOGRAPHY 237 (1979).
50. 9 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 456-75.
51. For a description of the practices see L. WILMERDING, JR., supra note 40, at 26.
52. 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 402. The observation is a
part of Hamilton's elaborate "explanation" of the system of anticipations. Id. at 400-27.
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[C]onsidered the present a good opportunity to determine how
far the House could go into an examination of the accounts of public
officers. It was true, that the Representatives of the people were the
guardians of the public money, and consequently it was their duty to
satisfy themselves as far as possible of the sources from which money
flowed into the Treasury - how that money was applied - under
what authority - and to inquire, at different times what balance re-
mained in the Treasury."'
As is so often the case, good republican principles were rediscovered
when they also served partisan purposes. Any attempt to understand
the development of the appropriations process in the last decade of the
eighteenth century must appreciate that it coincided with the emer-
gence of parties.
The 1792 Appropriations Act was actually the rare example of one
that became law before the beginning of the year to which it applied.
While, in all important respects it followed Hamilton's estimates to a
fraction of a penny, the statute appropriated aggregate amounts of
money, followed by the formula "that is to say" and lists of expendi-
tures that had either been lifted from Hamilton's "General Estimate
for the Services of the Ensuing Year""" or adapted from his more de-
tailed estimates. The language now ran along the following lines: for
the service of the year and the support of the civil list, there shall be
appropriated a sum of money not exceeding x dollars, "that is to say"
for the compensation granted by law to the district judges so many
dollars, for some other group of officials y dollars, for some third pur-
pose z dollars. 5 The principle of appropriations specificity was being
incorporated into the statutory text.
The following year appropriations specificity was carried one step
further by eliminating the distinction between civil and military ex-
penditures as separate heads and by reducing the dollar amounts at-
tached to each specific item. When the original House bill reached the
Senate, the Senate aggregated all War Department items into one sum.
The subsequent House debate on the amended bill stressed separation
of powers issues and is of great interest even though the reporter unfor-
tunately provided only the most general summary. It was argued that
the Senate approach left too much discretion in the department head
who "might apply the whole to a few of the objects . . . and leave all
53. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 221-29 (1792).
54. 9 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 475.
55. 1 Stat. 226-29 (1791).
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the other unsupported"; the argument suggests that there was doubt
about the legal force of the underlying estimates.56 The House defeated
the Senate amendment by one vote, and, for 1793, the Senate yielded.
The 1793 Appropriations Act contained one unwieldly appropriations
section consisting of a single paragraph that covers almost three pages
in the Statutes at Large.57
The House took no action on the proposal to lodge some discre-
tionary power in the President to meet contingencies: "[Flor instance,
it may be found expedient to mount the militia . . . and therefore in
some cases to apply the money, specifically appropriated for some of
the objects which might upon trial be discovered unnecesary, to other
objects of real utility." 58 This indicates some understanding of the need
for executive discretion, though apparently predicated on the notion
that without a specific grant of authority there might be no power to
shift funds from one purpose to another, even in the military arena.
After all, as President Jefferson asked about a decade later, "where is
the rule of legal construction to be found which ascribes less effect to
the words of an appropriation law, than of any other law." 59
The Appropriations Act for 1793 was approved on February 28 of
that year. At the same time Jefferson and the Republicans pursued
their full-fledged personal attack on Secretary Hamilton who by now
had become their favorite bete noire, suspected at all times of sinister
schemes and purposes as he shuffled funds from one continent to an-
other. The issue chosen involved two loans floated in Amsterdam and
Antwerp on the basis of two acts of Congress. The charge was that
Hamilton had intermingled these two loans though one had the purpose
of servicing only the domestic debt of the United States and the other
the purpose of paying the foreign debt.10 The details are too complex to
be rehearsed here and, in any event, are well known. Albert Gallatin,
who in 1795 following his election to the House became the Republi-
cans' financial expert, in his 1796 "Sketch of the Finances of the
United States" concluded that the charge was "strictly and literally
true," but "rather a want of form than a substantial violation of the
56. This issue was still debated by Jefferson as late as 1804. See Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to Albert Gallatin (February 19, 1804), reprinted in II THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 4-13 (A. Lipscomb, ed. 1905) (hereinafter JEFFERSON).
57. 1 Stat. 325-28 (1793).
58. 3 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 53, at 890.
59. JEFFERSON, supra note 56, at 13.
60. See the detailed account in 13 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 38,
at 532 (introductory note).
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appropriation law."'" Hamilton, on the other hand, thought that he had
had "considerable latitude of discretion" in "the business of the
loans" 2 and justified himself in an astonishing number of reports pro-
duced "by virtue of demonic labor" 3 between February 4 and Febru-
ary 19, 1793.64
On February 27 Representative William Giles of Virginia, Jeffer-
son's floorleader for this purpose, introduced nine resolutions of cen-
sure, all of which were extensively debated the following two days and
all of which were overwhelmingly defeated. The resolutions raise a host
of fascinating separation of powers questions. I shall refer here only to
the first of the resolutions which read: "1. Resolved, That it is essential
to the due administration of the Government of the United States, that
laws making specific appropriations of money should be strictly ob-
served by the administrator of the finances thereof."6 5 The ensuing de-
bate was on the question whether this resolution should be sent to the
Committee of the Whole House. The able William Loughton Smith, of
South Carolina, opened the debate by saying that this late in the ses-
sion was no time to discuss "theoretic principles of Government"; how-
ever, the future Federalist also argued: "Though the position contained
in the first resolution, as a general rule, was not- to be denied; yet it
must be admitted, that there may be cases of sufficient urgency to jus-
tify a departure from it, and to make it the duty of the legislature to
indemnify an officer. ... " Smith thus focused the controversy on
what afterward became understood as a central question: should there
only be one rigid rule or should exceptions to the rule be recognized?
The question grew into an exceedingly practical one the following
year when the militia hypothetical from the debate over 1793 appropri-
ations turned into a real case. In 1794 annual appropriations were not
enacted before March. Civil and military appropriations were, for the
first time, covered by two separate bills.67 Both bills used the "that is to
say" formula, though the one "making appropriations for the support
of the military establishment of the United States" employed much
more general categories than had been the case in 1793.
61. 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 111 (H. Adams ed. 1879 & photo reprint
1960).
62. 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 27.
63. F. MCDONALD, supra note 49, at 260.
64. 13 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 541 n.20.
65. 3 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 53, at 899.
66. Id. at 901.
67. For an explanation see L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS 328 n.18 (1978).
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The legislation could not and did not foresee the most significant
military expenditures of the year created by Hamilton's and Washing-
ton's decision "to call forth" the militia against the Whiskey Rebel-
lion.8 On a provisional basis expenses were defrayed out of the money
appropriated for the military establishment until Congress, after the
-fact, made the necessary appropriations. 9 In his "Sketch of the Fi-
nances" Gallatin took the position that this approach had been illegal:
"The necessity of the measure may in the mind of the Executive have
superseded every other consideration. The popularity of the Transac-
tion may have thrown a veil over its illegality. But it should by no
means be drawn hereafter as a precedent."70
In the next six years, before he himself became the longest serving
Treasury Secretary in American History, Albert Gallatin played the
role of the Republican gadfly stinging the Federalists. One of his pur-
poses was the pursuit of frugality.71 A Genevan by birth and upbring-
ing, he reflected the puritanism, plain living, and frugality of Geneva. 2
His other purpose was to implement his views of separation of powers
-views that were predicated on legislative supremacy in money
matters. 3
Gallatin's attempt to prevent any blending of powers employed
several strategies. First, immediately upon taking his seat in the House,
Gallatin saw to it that the chamber establish a Committee on Ways
and Means as he had known it in the Pennsylvania legislature.7 Sec-
ond, he fought for appropriations specificity by getting the Congress to
amend the 1797 civil and military appropriations bills through tighten-
ing the statutory appropriations formula. It now read that for the ex-
penditure of the civil list, etc., "the following sums be respectively ap-
propriated; that is to say" and this formula was followed by the
individual items without any aggregation. The appropriations act "for
the military and naval establishments"7 was constructed according to
68. For a critical assessment of this move see 3 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIs TIME 188-
90 (1974).
69. 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 61 at 117. See also I Stat. 404
(1793).
70. 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 61, at 118.
71. See E. BURROWS, ALBERT GALLATIN AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REPUBLICANS,
1761-1800 452 (1986).
72. R. WALTERS, ALBERT GALLATIN 3-4 (1957).
73. See the excellent account in E. BURROWS, supra note 71, at 467-93.
74. R. WALTERS, supra note 72, at 89.
75. 1 Stat. 498-501 (1797).
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the same model, except that it added the further stricture "which sums
shall be solely applied to the objects for which they are respectively
appropriated.""6
Gallatin said:
[H]is object in this amendment was, that each appropriation
should be specific; that it might not be supposed to be in the power of
the Treasury Department to appropriate to one object money which
had been specifically appropriated for any other object. He did not
know. . . whether, as to the Civil List, appropriations had ever been
mixed, or whether it was understood that they might be so mixed; but
they knew it had been officially declared that so far as related to the
Military Department, the items had been totally mixed: for instance,
if the estimate for clothing or any other item fell short, the officers of
the Treasury did not think themselves bound by the particular appro-
priation, but had recourse to other items, for which larger sums were
granted than there was occasion for. Such construction of the law...
totally defeated the object of appropriation, and it was necessary
therefore, so to express the law that no color for such a construction
should be given.
77
Gallatin was concerned with what he saw as Federalist abuses and
feared a "general relaxation" that placed the executive branch beyond
the law.
Though Gallatin won the 1797 battle, he lost the war for the re-
mainder of the Federalist period. The 1798 and 1799 civil appropria-
tions acts retained Gallatin's specificity formula.7 8 As concerns the mil-
itary, however, the Senate reverted to the old system. The 1798 act
which was not passed before June gave a lump sum appropriation of
$1.4 million; subcategories were introduced by using only the words
"that is to say," and the "shall be solely applied" stricture was
76. 1 Stat. 508-09 (1797). The adverb "respectively" is the very term employed by the 1666
Act of Parliament quoted above. See supra text accompanying note 9.
77. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2040 (1797); cf. 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra
note 61, at 116. For a detailed account of Gallatin's struggle with the new Treasury Secretary,
Oliver Wolcott, see L. WILMERDING, JR., supra note 40, at 28-49. It is important to keep in mind
that Gallatin was not a zealot on any of these matters and understood the need for a reasonable
discretion: "The most proper way would perhaps be not to enter so many details ... but to divide
the general appropriation under a few general heads only, allowing thereby sufficient latitude to
the executive officers of government, but confining them strictly, in the expenditure under each of
those general heads, to the sum appropriated by law." 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN,
supra note 61, at 117. See also House Report on Applications of Public Money (April 29, 1802);
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FINANCE 752-57 (R.H. Kohn eds. 1861).
78. See 1 Stat. 542 (1798) and I Stat. 717 (1799).
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dropped. 9 In light of the changes in legislative style that had been in-
troduced in prior years this must be interpreted as a congressional rati-
fication of executive branch discretion in the military field. For the
years 1800 and 1801 the "respectively appropriated" language disap-
peared even from the civil appropriations.80
In separation of powers terms there are two different ways of look-
ing at these developments. On the one hand, they may be viewed as a
battle over the power to disburse funds between legislative and execu-
tive elements that was won by the executive. While the constitutional
allocation of powers in the field of appropriations was accepted in prin-
ciple, in practice exceptions were recognized that responded to the per-
ceived need to anticipate appropriations and that gave the executive
branch wide discretion in the field of military appropriations.
On the other hand, and in my view more appropriately, these de-
velopments may be seen as an ongoing process of shaping governmental
structures in the absence of clear and convincing customs. Congress
and the executive branch were influenced by considerations of principle
and practical considerations of statecraft.8 They were also influenced
by considerations of political partisanship that increased as a conflu-
ence of ideological, economic and organizational factors led to the
emergence of identifiable political parties.
The "discovery" of appropriations specificity as a separation of
powers concept was furthered by partisanship. Yet appropriations spec-
ificity and its refinement through legislative drafting techniques also
attempted to implement the rule of law in the area of government
spending. One might indeed argue that the very return to prior legisla-
tive styles after 1797 reflected the acceptance rather than the rejection
of the principle. By expressly choosing the old formula, Congress im-
plicitly conferred discretion on the executive branch to shift funds from
one head to another, at least in the military arena. The answer to Jef-
ferson's rhetorical question, "where is the rule of legal construction to
be found which ascribes less effect to the words of an appropriation
law, than of any other law?", was that such rules of construction fol-
lowed from the words employed by a knowing legislator who appropri-
ated power in addition to money.
The spring of 1798, a period when the fever of partisan politics
79. 1 Stat. 563 (1798).
80. See 2 Stat. 62 (1800) and 2 Stat. 117 (1801). See also L. WHITE, supra note 67, at
329.
81. See Casper, supra note 2, at 260.
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over France had reached its pitch and Congress had become uncon-
strained in spending on defense and foreign relations, opened other
fronts where Gallatin could fight for legislative supremacy. His address
of March 1, 1798, "in many respects the high point of Gallatin's legis-
lative career, '"83 summed up his views on the role of appropriations in
the constitutional separation of powers system. The argument had been
advanced that Congress had an obligation to support financially the
diplomatic establishment that the President thought was necessary.
Gallatin answered:
This doctrine is as novel as it is absurd. We have always been
taught to believe, that in all mixed Governments, and especially in our
own, the different departments mutually operated as checks one upon
the other. It is a principle incident to the very nature of those govern-
ments; it is a principle which flows from the distribution and separa-
tion of Legislative and Executive powers, by which the same act, in
many instances, instead of belonging exclusively to either, falls under
the discretionary and partial authority of both; it is a principle of all
our state constitutions; it is a principle of the Constitution under
which we now act. . . .[A]lthough there is no clause which directs
that Congress shall be bound to appropriate money in order to carry
into effect any of the Executive powers, some gentlemen, recurring to
metaphysical subtleties, and abandoning the literal and plain sense of
the Constitution, say that . . . we . ..are under a moral obligation
in this instance to grant the money. It is evident that where the Con-
stitution has lodged the power, there exists the right of acting, and the
right of discretion.8"
In evaluating Gallatin's position, one should keep in mind that his
reference point was the constitutional framework, not some procrustean
theory:
The opinion of the Executive, and where he has a partial power,
the application of that power to a certain object, will ever operate as
powerful motives upon our deliberations. I wish it to have its full
weight; but I feel averse to a doctrine which would place us under the
sole control of a single force impelling us in a certain direction, to the
exclusion of all the other motives of action which should also influence
us.
8 4
82. E. BURROWS, supra note 71, at 486.




These remarks represented more than a conciliatory gesture. Gallatin
was neither obstinate nor impractical.
A few weeks after the March 1 speech, the House debated a
$50,000 deficiency in the 1797 contingency expenditures of the Quar-
termaster's Department. Gallatin argued that the deficiency should not
have been allowed to occur:
The Secretary of War was not justified in expending more in
these contingencies than was appropriated, (except in case of neces-
sity,) otherwise the Secretary of War, and not Congress, regulated the
expenditure of money. It would be necessary to inquire into this busi-
ness, and except some pressing necessity could be shown for going
beyond the appropriation, he should consider the Secretary of War as
highly blameable for having done so, as the appropriation is the only
check which the Legislature has over the contingent expenses.85
In short, in spite of the categorical nature of what he had to say about
the "illegal" militia expenditures against the Whiskey Rebellion, Galla-
tin allowed for "pressing necessities." In this sense his view was not
dramatically different from Hamilton's, who in a 1799 letter to Secre-
tary of War James McHenry commented:
[D]isbursements finally must no doubt be regulated by the laws
of appropriation. But provisory measures will often be unavoidable.
And confidence must sometimes be reposed in after Legislative sanc-
tion and Provision. . . . I would rather be responsible on proper occa-
sions for formal deviations than for a feeble insufficient and unpros-
perous course of public business proceeding from an over-scrupulous
adherence to general rules."6
If one gives due weight to the adjective "proper" in "on proper
occasions," the main difference between Hamilton and Gallatin may lie
in the adverb "often." While Gallatin understood that a responsible
official may sometimes have to act ultra vires, such acts were to be rare
exceptions to the rule. He was not willing to develop a metatheory to
account for exceptions since otherwise the exceptions might swallow up
the rule. He feared a "general relaxation."
This then is the point where we come to the "heroic" dimensions
of my mundane subject. Even in the business of appropriations it may,
at times, be unavoidable to make the sacrifice of risking one's career so
that one may act "responsibly." In taking responsibility one cannot be
85. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1317-18 (1800).
86. 24 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 31.
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sure of the concurrence of one's contemporaries, or the judgment of
history. The Whiskey Rebellion provides an illustration. As Gallatin
suggested, the popularity of the transaction "may have thrown a veil
over its illegality. ' '87 In the court of history, however, the transaction
has met with less approval. The judgment of at least one historian dif-
fers substantially. This is how it looks to Jefferson's biographer, Dumas
Malone:
[The armament] was represented by the government as a sign of
the majesty of the law, and Hamilton's interpretation of it as a timely
manifestation of the power of the young federal government was
taken up by his partisans and afterwards commanded wide acceptance
among historians. Since no opposition was encountered, this ostenta-
tious military display now appears disproportionate if not ridiculous
88
Thomas Jefferson, the President, and Albert Gallatin, the Trea-
sury Secretary, deserve praise for not changing their views about the
need for appropriations specificity once they switched sides and were in
charge of the executive branch. In his first Annual Message Jefferson
called for "appropriating specific sums to every specific purpose suscep-
tible of definition," opposed intermingling of funds, and wanted "the
undefined field of contingencies" reduced. 9 Nevertheless, it took all of
Jefferson's presidency before framework legislation9" on the subject was
enacted. 91 The 1809 statute postulated that "the sums appropriated by
law for each branch of expenditure in the several departments shall be
solely applied to the objects for which they are respectively appropri-
ated." It also conferred limited authority on the President to shift funds
within departments "if in his opinion necessary," but only during the
recess of Congress.9 2 Of course, given the Republicans' more or less
complete control of Congress, virtue was made somewhat easy.
Yet even Jefferson could not avoid heroism in the appropriations
field. When, in June 1807, the British ship "Leopard" attacked the
American frigate "Chesapeake" in Hampton Roads to force the sur-
87. See 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 61, at 118.
88. 3 D. MALONE, supra note 68, at 188.
89. 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 121 (P. Ford, ed. 1897).
90. For an explanation of this term see Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct
of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 482 (1976).
91. For a short account see N. CUNNINGHAM, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT UNDER JEF-
FERSON 114-17 (1978).
92. 2 Stat. 535 (1809).
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render of four seamen claimed to be British, the President had to start
preparing for the worst. Four months later, on October 27, he sent a
message to Congress in which he wrote as follows:
The moment our peace was threatened I deemed it indispensable
to secure a greater provision of those military stores with which our
magazines were not sufficiently furnished. To have awaited a previous
and special sanction by law would have lost occasions which might not
be retrieved. I did not hesitate, therefore, to authorize engagement for
such supplements to our existing stock as would render it adequate to
the emergencies threatening us, and I trust that the Legislature, feel-
ing the same anxiety for the safety of our country . . . will approve,
when done, what they would have seen so important to be done if then
assembled.9"
This Presidential heroism was a little cheap as the Chesapeake in-
cident had, according to Attorney General Rodney, "excited the spirit
of 76 and the whole country is literally in arms." '94 Even so, when Con-
gress gathered in October, John Randolph of Roanoke, by now a gad-
fly, "allowed that the crisis which occasioned the extraordinary ex-
penses in question, was an imminent one. It was so critical, that
Congress ought to have been immediately convened, in order that they
might have given authority by law for these extraordinary expenses,
and for adopting such measures, as national feeling and national honor
called for."
95
Randolph went on pressing his advantage rather ruthlessly:
He confessed he felt extremely reluctant to vote large sums for
the support of our degraded and disgraced Navy, for expenses, too,
that had been illegally incurred. He had endeavored in vain to procure
Gallatin on Finance .... In that book he recollected a case exactly
opposite to the present, where the President of the United States dur-
ing the Pennsylvania insurrection, made use of money to defray the
expenses incurred, which had been appropriated for a different object;
but not having the book in his possession he would not venture to
quote it, lest he should not do it correctly.96
Well, John Randolph should have trusted his memory. But then,
maybe his lawyer's point was beside the point. Had Jefferson done as
93. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 425-30 (J. D. Richardson ed. 1897).
94. N. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 91, at 56 (quoting Attorney General Rodney).
95. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 818-30 (1807) (statement of Rep. Randolph).
96. Id. The additional appropriations were voted. 2 Stat. 450 (1807).
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Randolph thought he should have, who will doubt that Congress would
have done what "national feeling and honor" called for? Maybe more,
maybe too much. Maybe that is what Jefferson wanted to avoid.
Maybe that is what was heroic about his failure to convene Congress.
At the end of the debate in which Randolph was so critical of his erst-
while hero, a Congressman from Pennsylvania by the name of John
Smilie rose and invoked the example of an ancient nation "who were
wont to discuss great national questions twice, once when they were
drunk, that they might not want spirit, and once when they were sober,
that they might not be deficient in prudence." '97 As our generation
knows only too well, prudence in appropriations is perhaps the most
desirable of all virtues in a legislator.
97. 17 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 95, at 830 (statement of Rep. Smilie).
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